This paper presents a theory on the endogenous choice of a country's education policy and the two-way causal relationship between trade and education systems. The setting of a country's education system determines its talent distribution and comparative advantage in trade; the possibility of trade by raising the returns to the sector of comparative advantage in turn induces countries to further di¤erentiate their education systems and reinforces the initial pattern of comparative advantage. Speci…cally, the Nash equilibrium choice of education systems by two countries interacting strategically are necessarily more divergent than their autarky choices, although the di¤erence is still less than what is socially optimal for the world. We provide some preliminary empirical evidence on the relationship between education, talent distribution, and trade.
Introduction
In this era of globalized knowledge economy, the education system, by shaping a country's human capital, may exert signi…cant in ‡uences on its comparative advantages in international trade. And conversely, a country's trade pattern and intensity may a¤ect how its education system is run. Such interactions between education and trade could be seen in recurrent reviews of education policies by nations across the world. In the US, for example, the National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) claimed in an in ‡uential report that America is at risk: "The risk is not only that the Japanese make automobiles more e¢ ciently than Americans . . . , or that American machine tools . . . are being displaced by German products. It is also that these developments signify a redistribution of trained capability throughout the globe. . . . If only to keep and improve on the slim competitive edge we still retain in world markets, we must dedicate ourselves to the reform of our educational system ..." 1
In spite of the clear importance and urgency of educational reform in its role of a¤ecting countries'comparative advantages, we are not aware of any formal analysis in the economics literature to shed light on this matter. This paper makes a …rst attempt at providing a theory on the two-way interactions between education policies and trade. In particular, we show that any initial di¤erence in education policies across countries that contributes to countries'comparative advantages will be further accentuated when countries move from autarky to trade. The intuition is that international trade increases the returns to the sector of comparative advantage, and thus induces countries to further di¤erentiate their education systems in order to maximize gains from specialization. As a result, a small di¤erence in initial education systems across countries, possibly due to historical or cultural variations across countries, will be further ampli…ed by the increase in international trade.
In this paper, we focus on an important characterization of a country's education system, which is the degree of centralization or homogenization it imposes on the students'skill formation, and its e¤ect on a country's talent distribution. If schools are designed to equip all students, especially those with low abilities, with a homogenous set of skills, they have to impose certain disciplines so that students have to work hard to pass numerous tests. This type of education system is often associated with a uniform curriculum, high-stake tests, and other centralized methods, as is evident in Japan and other East Asian countries. The resulting huge pressures to conform with the uniform standards in terms of education outputs tend to sti ‡e the development of individual talents among students, and hence push all students toward the mean. In contrast, if schools adopt a low-pressure approach, encouraging students to learn at their own pace and forgiving low performance, students have more freedom to pursue their individual interests and realize their potentials; without the necessary discipline, however, the less talented students may fail to acquire the basic set of skills.
This approach is often carried out in a decentralized education system as is exempli…ed by the US system. In other words, the Japanese style of education system promotes homogeneity in the distribution of skills, while the US education system leads to more diversity. The education systems in other countries, di¤erent in their orientation toward these two approaches, generally fall in between these two extremes (Cummings 1999) .
We show in theory that by altering the resulting talent distribution, di¤erent educational approaches will lead to di¤erences in comparative advantage and trade structure in countries with otherwise identical economic constraints. Speci…cally, the decentralized and low-pressure education system in the US tends to promote talent diversity in its work force, which enhances the productivity of industries that bene…t from worker skill heterogeneity (e.g. software and movie); in contrast, with a centralized and high-pressure education system, Japanese work force tends to be more homogenous in their skills, which increases the productivity of industries characterized by long and complex production processes (e.g. automobile and machinery). It then follows that countries with more decentralized education systems will have a comparative advantage in the software-type industries and countries with more centralized education systems a comparative advantage in the automobile-type industries.
Given the e¤ects of education system on production and a country's comparative advantage, we show that the endogenous choice of education system across countries will exhibit more divergence under trade than under autarky. This is because the equilibrium price with trade will fall in between autarky prices and thus strengthen the incentives of a country to specialize more in the sector of its comparative advantage, not only via automatic resource reallocation across sectors with a given work force, but also through active adjustment in education policies to reshape the composition of its work force and the position of its production possibility frontier.
In particular, we identify the choice of education system under autarky by individual countries who may di¤er in their cultural attitudes toward education styles, but are otherwise identical in economic constraints and initial talent distributions. We then characterize the choice of education system under trade that is socially optimal for the world as a whole. This is compared with the noncooperative choice in the Nash equilibrium where each country maximizes its own welfare taking into account the terms-of-trade e¤ect of its education policies. It is shown that the di¤erence in education systems across countries under trade is larger than under autarky. However, the crosscountry di¤erence in education systems under the Nash equilibrium is less than what is socially optimal for the world. The intuition is that the incentive to specialize through more divergent education systems is weakened in each country by the accompanying terms-of-trade loss, which on the other hand cancels out for all countries in the world welfare's calculation.
We conduct some preliminary empirical analysis to demonstrate our theory's empirical relevance. Based on the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) dataset, which contains information on student performance and curriculum structure, we propose some measures of curriculum centralization to capture the theory's characterization of national education systems in terms of the degree of homogenization imposed on students' skill formation. We show that in the sample of OECD countries, a more centralized curriculum structure is indeed associated with a lower skill diversity, and the relationship is consistently signi…cant. Furthermore, as the trade intensity between a pair of countries increases, their curriculum structures tend to become more divergent. This is consistent with our theoretical prediction that trade tends to reinforce countries'initial di¤erences in education systems. However, given the caveats that will be noted in the empirical section, more research into the empirical measures of education systems is needed to provide more persuasive conclusions.
Viewed from a broader perspective, this paper contributes to the literature in two ways: …rst, it demonstrates the possibility of education policy as a new source of comparative advantage in trade, and second, it emphasizes how trade can in turn a¤ect a country's institutions such as education systems. To our knowledge, this endogenous determination of both education system and trade pattern as an equilibrium outcome has not been examined in the literature. This paper is closely related to the literature on human capital (talent) and trade. This literature generally falls into two branches: The …rst branch takes talent distribution as given and analyzes its e¤ect on comparative advantage and trade pattern, while the second branch studies the e¤ect of trade on the stock of human capital using …xed human capital production functions. Our paper integrates these two strands of literature by explicitly modeling the triangular relationship between education policy, human capital and trade. The introduction of education policy in our model in ‡uences the human capital formation process and determines the composition of human capital in a country. The resulting talent distribution then a¤ects a country's comparative advantage and trade pattern (as in the …rst literature). When countries endogenously choose their education policies relative to their trading partners to maximize social welfare, there are feedback e¤ects of trade on human capital (as in the second literature). This paper thus provides new insights into the important role of education policy in a¤ecting the relationship between human capital and trade.
The …rst branch of the literature starts with the pioneer work by Grossman and Maggi (2000) , who show that between two trading countries, the one with a more diverse (homogeneous) talent pool tends to exhibit a comparative advantage in producing goods or services with a submodular (supermodular) technology. This may account for the trade pattern between the US and Japan, where the US has more diverse talents and exports software, while Japan has more homogeneous talents and exports cars. The e¤ect of talent distribution on trade is also examined by other studies based on alternative mechanisms including the role of costly monitoring of workers (Grossman 2004) , the implications of two-dimensional skill heterogeneity (Ohnsorge and Tre ‡er 2007) , the trade of high-tech versus primary product (Bougheas and Riezman 2007) , and the empirical evidence about the e¤ect of skill dispersion on trade patterns (Bombardini et al. 2009 ). The second branch of the literature includes Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) and Bond et al. (2003) among others. In Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) , it is observed that trade will accentuate the autarky di¤erence between countries in skilled-unskilled labor proportions. This is similar in spirit to our result that the initial pattern of comparative advantage is sustained and the di¤erence in the human capital composition between countries is augmented by trade. By allowing endogenous formation of both physical and human capital, Bond et al. (2003) show that the ranking of countries'relative factor abundance and trade pattern may actually persist or reverse over time. Such indeterminacy is thus in contrast with the implication of the current paper and that of Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) .
In another strand of literature, several papers also explicitly link education with trade but di¤er from us in the issues and the speci…c education policies studied. Kim and Kim (2000) assume that school education enhances general human capital versus industry-speci…c skills, which together with international trade allows workers to move easily to the fastest-growing industry and hence facilitates economic growth. In an oligarchy society where landed elites have more political power, Falkinger and Grossmann (2005) show that public education investment conducive to industrialization is typically lower in an open economy than in autarky; this is similar in spirit to our result that an open economy may adopt a more extreme education approach than in autarky. Bougheas et al. (2009) also analyze the possible e¤ect of trade on a country's education policy.
They formulate the education policy, however, as a choice by a small open economy of whether to move up or down the skill chain, taking the terms of trade as given; this is in contrast with our focus on the education policy to a¤ect the diversity of human capital and the optimal allocation of talent across sectors. More importantly, our analysis takes into account the consequence of education policies on the equilibrium trade prices and patterns, which enables us to study the interactions of education policies across countries and their endogenous divergence.
The current paper also connects with the economics literature on education that examines how di¤erent education regimes (public versus private, ability tracking versus ability pooling) a¤ect the dispersion of skills and aggregate output in closed economies (see for example Bénabou 1996 , Epple and Romano 1998 , Fernández and Rogerson 1998 , Takii and Tanaka 2009 ). An innovative feature of the current paper in comparison to this literature is that the education regimes are endogenously determined across countries and inherently linked with international trade. The paper's focus on the degree of centralization in an education system also highlights an important dimension distinct from the above literature's typical emphasis on school …nancing methods.
The education literature has only recently begun to assess the implications of globalization on education policies (Green 1997 , Burbules and Torres 2000 , Mok 2005 . Though "there is consider-able convergence at the level of policy rhetoric and general policy objectives, there is less evidence of any systematic convergence at the level of structures and processes in di¤erent countries" (Green 1999) . This is consistent with our …ndings in this paper that di¤erences in education systems across countries may be a persistent pattern reinforced by increasing trade, driven by countries' incentives to enhance gains from specialization. To our knowledge, these results are new to the education-related literature and may provide fresh perspectives for formulating education policies. This paper is organized as follows. The elements of the model are described in Section 2. The endogenous choice of education system is analyzed in Section 3. We take our model to data and present some preliminary empirical evidence in Section 4. Section 5 discusses modeling choices and possible extensions. Section 6 concludes.
The Basic Model

The Education System
Suppose there is a unit measure of a continuum of pupils indexed by i, whose innate abilities a i0 are not individually observable, but follow a distribution G( ) with support [a l0 ; a h0 ] (0; +1). All pupils have to go through an education system that may possibly change their initial skills. The education system is characterized by a parameter 2 [0; 1], which indicates the level of discipline imposed on each student. Speci…cally, a pupil with an innate ability a i0 will acquire a skill level a i at graduation such that
where a m = R a h0 a l0 a i0 dG(a i0 ) is the average ability of the cohort. Thus, an education system with a high will push all students'skills to the middle and reduce the skill diversity, while keeping the mean ability unchanged. 
We will often write the adulthood distribution as F (a i ) to simplify presentations, bearing in mind that it depends on . The adults are ranked according to their abilities such that a i a j for i < j.
We can generalize (1) to allow an additional bene…t e of education that is independent of the discipline level, that is, a i = (1 )a i0 + a m + e. It is straightforward to verify that the subsequent results will not be a¤ected. We take the functional form (1) henceforth to focus on the education system's impact on talent diversity and abstract from its potential impact on human capital accumulation.
This simple model of education attempts to capture the necessary tension between equipping all students with a common set of knowledge versus promoting talent diversity. The former goal is usually better achieved with more discipline, where students have to go through numerous exercises and exams that test whether they have met required standards before they can go to the next level of study. The high stakes involved in passing standard exams, however, often discourage students from exploring and acquiring new knowledge in their own ways, and hence may reduce the creativity component of human capital (Mayer et al. 1991 ). The opposite is true for pursuing the second goal, where lenient standards are set to leave more freedom for individual exploration and hence may preserve more talent diversity. Education systems may vary across countries in their orientation toward these two goals. Among industrial countries, Japan and the US are arguably the two prominent examples at the opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of the degree of emphasis that schools place on one of these two goals relative to the other.
The innate or initial abilities a i0 are taken to be unobservable here to underlie the di¢ culty of the education system to correctly evaluate each student's true talent and to tailor the teaching method according to each individual's ability. For example, if the initial abilities were fully observable, the education resources would be best utilized to raise the abilities of the less-talented students with a more disciplined education method but those of the more-talented students with a less-structured curriculum. The unobservability of initial abilities highlights the trade-o¤ of positive and negative e¤ects in choosing a particular education style on the resulting human capital of the population.
The Economy
Technology. We lay out the structure of the economy below and demonstrate the implications of given education systems on production and trade patterns. The results are consistent with the existing work in the literature with exogenous talent distributions. 2 Our main departure from the literature starts in Section 3 where we explicitly analyze the choice of education system.
There are two industries in the economy. In the automobile industry, the production technology is supermodular with decreasing returns to overall talent, 3
where n is the number of tasks required. The supermodularity of the auto production is re ‡ected by the fact that @ 2 y A =@a(j)@a(j 0 ) > 0, for all j 6 = j 0 2 f1; 2; : : : ng and the decreasing returns to 2 Comparison between our setup and that of Grossman and Maggi (2000) and the reasons for the modi…cations are provided in Section 5. 3 The speci…c production functional form for the auto industry is adopted for illustrative purposes. The same results can be achieved with the following general functional form: yA H(a(1); a(2); ; a(n)) with symmetric tasks such that @ 2 H=@a(j)@a(j 0 ) > 0, for all j 6 = j 0 2 f1; 2; : : : ng and that H( a(1); a(2); ; a(n)) = H(a(1); a(2); ; a(n)), with 0 < and 0 < < 1.
overall talent by the fact that < 1. In the other industry, the software industry, the output is completely re ‡ective of individual talent,
and exhibits increasing returns to the talent. Let p = p S =p A denote the relative price of software.
As shown in Grossman and Maggi (2000) or similarly argued in Kremer (1993) , the output of an industry characterized by supermodular technology is maximized when workers of the same ability work in the same team (…rm). Thus, in a competitive equilibrium, where each …rm earns no positive pro…t, the wage structure of the auto industry satis…es
where n 1 corresponds to the benchmark wage when each task is performed by workers of a unit talent. Thus, in each auto …rm, the workers sharing the same talent level divide evenly and exhaust the revenue of the auto output. Firms are indi¤erent between hiring a lower-talent team and a higher-talent team, as the wage payment is re ‡ective of the output response to the talent level. On the other hand, the software industry's wage structure in a competitive equilibrium is simply
where each software worker receives the whole value of his/her output. Si ; where 0 < < 1, and c Ai and c Si denote individual i's consumption of cars and software, respectively. The budget constraint is c Ai + pc Si = w i , where w i is the individual's income that is equal to either w A (a i ) or w S (a i ) depending on the worker's occupation. The optimal consumption choices are thus
which lead to the indirect utility function
Talent Allocation Across Industries. Each worker takes as given the relative price of software p. A worker joins the auto industry if and only if w A (a i ) w S (a i ), which implies
As a worker's wage income increases in his own ability at a decreasing rate if he works in the auto industry but at an increasing rate if he works in the software industry, a worker will choose to work in the software industry if his own ability is su¢ ciently high. In (7), e a(p) denotes the highest ability of workers to join the auto industry, which coincides with the ability of the marginal worker who is indi¤erent between joining either one of the two industries. This cuto¤ obviously hinges upon the relative goods price.
Lemma 1 @e a @p < 0.
Proof. Based on the de…nition e a(p) in (7), we get @e a @p = 1 e a p < 0: The intuition is that, as the relative price of software p falls, a worker's income in the software industry drops; as a result, the cuto¤ talent level e a increases. When the price falls to p l a h , even the most talented worker a h will become indi¤erent between working in either one of the industries. On the other hand, when the price of software rises above p h a l , even the least talented worker a l will be attracted to work in the software industry. When the cuto¤ ability is equal to the mean a m , the corresponding price is p m a m , where p l p m p h holds due to
there is incomplete specialization. Our following analyses focus on the scenarios where there is incomplete specialization unless otherwise noted.
Given the talent allocation, the total outputs in the auto and software industry are, respectively,
Note that an auto …rm consists of n workers of the same ability; thus, the density of auto …rms is 1 n times the density of the auto workers'abilities dF (a) in the above calculation of auto output. Production Possibility Frontier (PPF). The PPFs corresponding to two di¤erent education systems with J > U are illustrated in Figure 1 . The maximum potential output of software
is lower with a higher , as a higher decreases the talent diversity and the software output is convex in talent. On the contrary, the maximum potential output of cars
a dF (a) is higher with a higher , as the auto output is concave in overall talent.
Thus, a country with a higher discipline level in the education system will have a PPF that is relatively skewed toward the auto output axis and vice versa for a country with a lower level of .
Note that the corresponding prices at the end points of the PPF are p l at Y max
With a higher discipline level , p l increases and p h decreases; thus, the curvature of PPF also reduces with a higher . 4
Figure 1: E¤ects of Education System on PPF Note that for given and PPF, an increase in the cuto¤ ability e a corresponds to a migration of workers toward the auto sector from the software sector, which has a positive e¤ect on the auto output and a negative e¤ect on the software:
These two conditions imply that M RT
@e a = e a , which is equal to p by (7), verifying the optimality of the competitive equilibrium.
As indicated in Figure 1 , for a large range of potential prices, the country with a higher level of will produce relatively more auto while the country with a lower level of relatively more software, given the same relative price p. Only when the price is extremely high, near the price level at T 0 J , will we see a reversal of the positive relationship between the relative auto output and the education policy . The following lemma speci…es a su¢ cient condition on the price level for the positive relationship to hold.
Lemma 2
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 shows that an education system with a higher discipline level increases the output of the auto industry but decreases the output of the software industry when the relative price of software is not too high. The intuition is as follows. With the price level (and hence the cuto¤ talent level e a) held constant, an increase in the discipline level reduces the diversity of worker abilities in both industries. Because the auto industry's output is concave in each production unit (…rm)'s worker ability while the software industry's output is convex in each worker's ability, a reduced diversity in worker abilities in the above manner has a positive e¤ect on the aggregate auto output and a negative e¤ect on the aggregate software output. The other e¤ect of an increase in the discipline level is changing the identity (e a 0 = e a am 1 ) of the marginal workers and hence the density of workers in each industry. Within the price range p p m , however, the mean ability workers always work in the auto sector (since a m e a), and thus an increase in will increase the density of auto workers, reinforcing the …rst e¤ect. The condition p p m is su¢ cient but not necessary for the results in Lemma 2 to hold. 5
Equilibrium Analysis
Autarky Equilibrium. In the autarky equilibrium, the domestic markets of both auto and software are clear so that the ratio of total supplies for cars and software is equal to the ratio of their total demands. That is,
where the second equality is derived from (4) and (5), and a decoration b x over a variable x indicates the autarky equilibrium value of the corresponding variable x. This leads to the autarky equilibrium
which is unique because the LHS is strictly increasing in p, while the RHS of the equation strictly decreases in p: (8) and (9), and @e a @p < 0 by Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 A su¢ cient condition for p p m (or equivalently, a m e a) to hold is
This lemma shows that under condition (A1), the equilibrium price will not be larger than p m , or equivalently, workers with the mean talent level will work in the auto sector. The same outcome that the mean talent workers work in the supermodular (auto) sector is achieved in Grossman and Maggi (2000) under the assumption of symmetric talent distributions; in comparison, condition (A1) covers more grounds by allowing asymmetric talent distributions as long as the mean talent level is not above the median. The assumption 1 2 on the preferences implies that a larger proportion of consumption is on manufacturing goods characterized by production chains (e.g., cars, electronics, food, clothing) than on creative products characterized by individual performance (e.g., software, movies, books, concerts), which seems consistent with reality. In what follows, we assume condition (A1) holds. 6 Lemma 4 The autarky equilibrium price increases with the discipline level in the education system, i.e.,
Condition (11) can be rewritten as V (b p; ) = 0, based on which we get
(1 )
by Lemma 2 and (8), (9), and Lemma 1.
Lemma 4 shows that the higher the level of discipline in education, the higher the relative autarky price for software in equilibrium. The intuition is obvious; as the relative supply of software is lower when is higher and as the preference is homothetic, a closed economy with a higher will have a higher relative price for software.
Free Trade Equilibrium. Suppose that a world consists of two representative countries, Japan (J) and the US (U ). They have the same economic structure as described above, but di¤erent education systems ( J > U ). That is, Japan's education system has more discipline than the US's, and as a result, the adult talent distribution a i is more homogenous in Japan than in the US, though the talent distribution among children (a i0 ) is identical in the two countries.
Rationales for such a di¤erence in education systems across countries even though they are the same in economic structure to begin with will be discussed in Section 3.
Given the di¤erent education systems ( J > U ), Lemma 4 suggests that Japan will have a higher relative autarky price for software than the US (b p J > b p U ). Thus, with the possibility of trade, Japan (the US) will have a comparative advantage in cars (software) and will export cars (software).
By similar arguments as in the case for the autarky price b p, we know that the free trade equilibrium price p is uniquely determined by
where Y AJ and Y AU are the auto outputs in Japan and the US, respectively, and Y SJ and Y SU are the software outputs in the two countries. A decoration x over a variable x indicates the free trade equilibrium value of the corresponding variable x. It follows that b p J > p > b p U holds for any given education systems in the two countries with J > U .
The free trade equilibrium price p is higher when either J or U is higher, as either change will increase the relative supply of cars in the world market. The following lemma shows this formally.
Lemma 5 The free trade equilibrium price increases with either country's discipline level in the education system, i.e.,
To sum up this section, we have produced the same general prediction as the previous literature on the pattern of comparative advantage for given talent distributions, but allowed an explicit role of education policy to in ‡uence the formation of talent distributions. 7 In particular, we have shown that, if Japan adopts a higher discipline level in the education system than the US, Japan will have a comparative advantage in goods di¤erent from the US, even though they have the same initial economic fundamentals.
The resulting trade pattern between Japan and the US turns out to be a stable one, as the price change from autarky to trade will induce countries to choose education styles that further reinforce their comparative advantages and trade pattern: the possibility of trade induces a revision of education systems that are further divergent across countries than autarky choices. We show this in the next section.
Endogenous Education System
We begin the analysis of education policy by characterizing the socially optimal education system under autarky, where di¤erences in non-economic factors such as culture or ideology lead to di¤erent preferred education styles across countries. Given the di¤erent choices of education systems under 7 We have generalized some aspects of the existing models at the cost of restricting other aspects to arrive at a structure that embeds inherent trade-o¤s in setting education policies. Most existing models do not exhibit such trade-o¤s among di¤erent PPFs; instead, there exists some strictly dominating PPF in these models if PPFs (talent distributions) are allowed to change by policies.
autarky, we then study how countries react to the possibility of trade and how the optimal choice of education system changes compared to autarky.
A higher level of discipline in the education system usually corresponds to more rules and regulations imposed on the curriculum, the textbooks, the frequency of tests, the length of school hours, and the monitoring of student performance. Requirements such as these may translate into disutility for each student undergoing the system. For example, the disutility could be the leisure time sacri…ced for study, the stress endured during each test, the lack of ‡exibility to pursue one's own subjects of interest at di¤erent pace or depth, and so on. The higher the discipline level, the more stringent the rules and regulations, and the more disutility it will entail. To capture this observation, we suppose that the imposition of discipline on students entails a disutility of K j ( ) k j on each individual in country j, where j = J; U , and 0 < k J < k U . That is, one society attaches a lower disutility to a given level of discipline than the other, possibly due to di¤erences in their cultural or historical backgrounds. In particular, we suppose that the Japanese …nd it less costly than the American in making e¤orts to conform to homogeneity in education (Section 5 provides some discussions of why this seems to be the case).
Education Systems under Autarky
Given the indirect utility function in (6), the net aggregate welfare of a country with a discipline level is
where we have suppressed the dependence of most variables on the education policy to simplify presentations. The last equality holds since the total wage income of the population is equal to the total value of production of the economy by perfect competition. In autarky, the price observes the autarky equilibrium condition (11).
Let a denote the optimal education choice under autarky that maximizes U ( ) and b p a the corresponding autarky equilibrium price. The following …rst order condition (FOC) must hold at
where the second equality follows, …rst because
@e a = p, and second, by plugging in the autarky equilibrium condition (11). At the optimal choice, the second order condition (SOC)
< 0 must also hold. Thus, with k J < k U , it follows that the optimal autarky discipline level in Japan will be higher than in the US, i.e.,
Education Systems under Trade
Small Open Economy. We …rst characterize the unilateral optimal choice of education system that would be made by a small open economy. That is, the country takes the world price as given and does not take into account the e¤ect of its choice of education system on the world price.
The analysis here thus assumes away the terms-of-trade consideration by a large country when setting the education policy. We will analyze the terms-of-trade e¤ect shortly. As will become clear, many useful insights can be drawn from comparing this simple scenario against the other more comprehensive scenarios.
Proposition 1
The optimal education system of a small open economy, s , decreases with the given trade price, p.
Proof. The FOC to maximize the aggregate welfare of a small open economy taking the trade price as given is
Note that
where the second equality obtains because M RT = p. Based on the above condition, we get
by Lemma 2. This implies
Proposition 1 states that an increase in the relative price of software, p, will induce a small open economy to adjust downward the discipline level in its education system, while the opposite is true when p goes down. Note that the autarky optimal education system of country j, World Optimal Choice. We now analyze the optimal choice of education systems for the two countries by a world social planner who takes into account the e¤ects of education systems on equilibrium trade volumes and price. The world social planner chooses the education systems that maximize the joint welfare of the two countries:
where the price observes the free trade equilibrium condition (13). Given (17), we obtain the following FOC for J :
where the second equality follows by the fact that M RT = p in both countries and by plugging in the free trade equilibrium condition (13). Similarly, we can obtain the following FOC for U :
Let w J ( U ) denote the solution of J to (18) given any U , and similarly let w U ( J ) denote the solution of U to (19) given any J . It is straightforward to verify that (18), where the e¤ects of J on p and the e¤ects of p on the joint income and welfare of the two countries are eliminated in the …nal expression. The only things that matter are the direct e¤ect of J on Japan's own production choice and that of U on the US's own production choice. Thus, the optimal choice of education systems by a world social planner turns out to be the same as the noncooperative equilibrium choice of education systems by individual countries if they behave as price takers.
Proposition 2 The optimal choice of education systems ( w J ; w U ) by a world social planner that maximizes the world welfare under trade coincides with the noncooperative equilibrium choice of education systems by individual countries behaving as price takers in the world market. Relative to autarky, the di¤ erence in education styles is further enlarged after trade in the world socially optimal outcome:
Proof. If Japan behaves as a price taker, its FOC to maximize its aggregate welfare is (16) with k = k J , which is identical to the world social planner's FOC (18). Thus, w J ( U ) can also be regarded as Japan's best response function, when Japan behaves as a price taker, where the price taken as given by Japan follows the trade equilibrium condition (13) for given U and J . Similarly, w U ( J ) can also be regarded as the US's best response function, when the US behaves as a price taker. The noncooperative equilibrium outcome, when each of these two countries maximizes their individual welfare but behaves as price takers, occurs at the intersection W of the two schedules w J ( U ) and w U ( J ), which is identical to the world social planner's choice. This proves the …rst part of the proposition.
To show the second part of the proposition, note that if k U were to decrease to the level of Figure 2 and intersect w J ( U ) at point W J on the 45 line. This is the hypothetical world social planner's choice if both countries had identical disutility factors equal to k J . But if both countries were identical, the equilibrium trade price would be equal to either country's autarky price. In particular, this is Japan's realized autarky price with k J .
Hence, the level of J corresponding to point W J is Japan's autarky optimal choice of education system, given that the FOC for Japan's autarky decision (15) and the FOC for the world social planner's decision of Japan's education system (18) are identical if evaluated at the same price level.
Analogously, if k J were to increase to the level of k U , w J ( U ) would shift in (not shown) and intersect w U ( J ) at point W U on the 45 line in Figure 2 . This is the hypothetical world social planner's choice if both countries had identical disutility factors equal to k U . But then the equilibrium trade price would be equal to either country's autarky price. In particular, this is the US's realized autarky price with k U . Hence, the level of U corresponding to point W U is the US's autarky optimal choice of education system, given that the FOC for the US's autarky decision (15) and the FOC for the world social planner's decision of the US's education system (19) are identical if evaluated at the same price.
Thus, the combination of the socially optimal education systems under autarky in the two countries corresponds to point A in Nash Equilibrium Choice. If countries choose education systems unilaterally (as is likely the case in reality) and take into consideration the terms-of-trade e¤ect of their education policies, the resulting Nash equilibrium ( n J ; n U ; p n ) tends to di¤er from the above socially optimal outcome ( w J ; w U ; p w ). The intuition is that Japan would not want to raise J in the Nash equilibrium as much as it would as a price taker (or in the world optimal outcome), since a higher J increases the auto output, depresses the world price of cars which it exports, and hurts its terms of trade; the reverse is true for the US, who would not want to lower U in the Nash equilibrium as much as it would as a price taker. Such a terms-of-trade loss is ignored by a small open economy, or is o¤set by the equivalent terms-of-trade gain of the other country in a world social planner's calculation.
Thus, by taking the terms-of-trade e¤ect into consideration, countries tend to specialize less than in the socially optimal outcome. This is formally proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In a free trade equilibrium where each country simultaneously chooses its education system taking as given the other country's choice, the education systems in Japan and the US diverge more from their autarky levels but less than the socially optimal levels:
Proof. The objective function of Japan is
subject to the trade equilibrium condition (13). The FOC for a best response
The second equality follows again by the fact that M RT = p and by plugging in the trade equilibrium condition (13). Given that The objective function of the US is
subject to the trade equilibrium condition (13). The FOC for a best response n U ( J ) given J can be obtained analogously:
By the same token, the term thus, it follows that
Note that in either the individual autarky optimization problem or the world social planner's optimization problem, the e¤ect of the endogenous price change on the autarky welfare or the joint world welfare is zero. A software price increase has a positive income e¤ect scaled by the output of the software industry. At the same time, it entails a negative consumption e¤ect. In autarky, the two e¤ects o¤set each other, as production equals consumption. In the joint welfare calculation, the two e¤ects similarly o¤set each other, as the two countries'joint production equals their joint consumption. This is not the case when countries optimize individual welfare under trade. For an autoexporting country, it produces relatively less software than it consumes; thus, a software price increase will lead to relatively less income gain than consumption loss, and as a result, an overall terms-of-trade loss. The opposite is true for the software-exporting country. Hence, whenever J > U and as a result, Japan is an exporter of cars, Japan would not want to raise the discipline level as much as the world social planner's optimal choice, because an increase in the discipline level increases the auto output, increases the relative price of software which it imports, and creates a terms-of-trade loss. In contrast, the US, as an exporter of software, would not want to lower the discipline level as much as the world social planner's optimal choice, because a decrease in the discipline level increases the software output, decreases its relative price, and creates a terms-of- The more asymmetric the two countries are in their education systems and hence the more imbalanced they are in their production structures, the stronger the terms-of-trade e¤ect. This is re ‡ected in Figure 2 by the larger distance between n J ( U ) and w J ( U ) or that between n U ( J ) and w U ( J ) as one moves further away from the 45 line. As indicated by Figure 2 , the two countries' education systems at the Nash equilibrium (point N ) are more divergent than in autarky (point A), but are not as divergent as would be prescribed by the world social planner's optimal choice (point W ).
Empirical Relevance
In this section, we present some measures of curriculum centralization in education systems and its e¤ects on talent diversity. We also provide some preliminary empirical evidence on the e¤ects of trade intensity change on cross-country di¤erences in education systems. Curriculum Centralization Measure. Given the data in TIMSS, there are two plausible ways to measure curriculum centralization in a country. The …rst measure is based on the responses of the national representative to the curriculum questionnaire which asks whether any of the seven listed methods are "used to help implement the national mathematics (science) curriculum at grade 8". The measure is the sum of yes (=1) or no (=0) answers to the seven questions if there exists 8 Appendix B gives the list of participating OECD countries. In particular, we will restrict our attention to the OECD countries which were current members by 2003 (when the last TIMSS survey used in our study was conducted), and where all regions in a country participated in TIMSS together.
9 These statistics can be found in TIMSS 1995 Mathematics (Science) Achievement in the Middle School Years such a national curriculum, and it is zero if no national curriculum exists in a country. 10 Since the answers are often the same for both math and science curricula in the sample of OECD countries, the …nal measure is the average of the two, and its scale is normalized to the unit interval. A larger measure indicates a higher degree of curriculum centralization at the national level. This measure is available only in the 2003 survey.
Countries with similar stated centralization policies at the national level, however, may di¤er from each other in their actual implementation practices at the school level; the di¤erences may also evolve over time even when the written policy does not change (Astiz et al. 2002) . In view of this, our second measure of curriculum centralization incorporates information of school-level practices, where we take the average of the national-level measure constructed above and the school-level implementation index discussed below.
In TIMSS 1995 and 1999, the school questionnaire addressed to school principals includes 15
questions regarding the importance of various forces in determining the curriculum. These 15 forces can be regarded to represent centralizing or decentralizing forces in view of our model. does not have a national curriculum council and the question was not administered in 1995. 12 The school-level implementation index is calculated as the ratio of the average importance of the three centralizing forces and the average importance of the 12 decentralizing forces; it is then normalized to the unit interval to be consistent with the national-level measure. 13
The national-level measure has good international comparability, as the curriculum questionnaire is answered by a national representative, and the relevant questions we use in constructing the measure are the same across countries. In contrast, some questions used in the school-level index could be deleted or modi…ed by countries in accordance with their national education systems.
The adaptations could also di¤er across waves of surveys in the same country. As a result, the cross-country comparability of the school-level index by itself is noisy. 14 Thus, the average of the national-level measure and the school-level implementation index aims to capture the international comparability of the national-level measure and at the same time to incorporate the time-series variation in the tendency of curriculum centralization observed at the school level. As the national- Curriculum Centralization and Score Diversity. When we regress the score diversity on the degree of curriculum centralization in the sample of OECD countries, a negative and statistically signi…cant relationship emerges in all three years of surveys. 16 Figure 3 presents the regression result for year 1995, where the estimated slope coe¢ cient is negative and highly signi…cant. 17 The same result also holds for year 1999; as shown in Figure 4 , the estimated slope is quite similar to that in 1995 even though the samples are slightly di¤erent. Figure 5 suggests that the negative and signi…cant relationship between curriculum centralization and score diversity also holds in that the more centralized a country's curriculum structure is, the more homogeneous its student performance tends to be, which is consistent with our theoretical characterization of the education system and its e¤ect on talent distribution. Incidentally, the data also show clearly that the US and Japan indeed have the most extreme education systems in terms of curriculum centralization in the sample of countries.
Education System and Trade. Our theory predicts a wider divergence in education policies between countries as they go from no trade to completely free trade. In reality, we do not observe the autarky state but the rise and fall in trade intensity between countries. Thus, we look instead at the relationship between the change in bilateral trade intensity over time for a pair of countries and the corresponding change in their education styles to see whether the empirical pattern is consistent with our prediction.
A second caveat is that our theoretical prediction is more of a long-term relationship, but measures of curriculum centralization comparable across countries over a long period of time are not available. What we have are the second measures of curriculum centralization for both 1995 and 1999. In this time frame, they likely re ‡ect more of short-run variations in the school-level implementation than long-run shifts in the national-level policy. They are also relatively noisy for reasons mentioned above. Given this, it is likely di¢ cult to detect a systematic relationship between education and trade based on this dataset. Therefore, in the end, the empirical evidence we can show is extremely preliminary.
The change in relative di¤erence in education systems between a pair of countries (k; l) is centralization, and vice versa. This is consistent with our theoretical prediction. Given the caveat noted above, the result is quite encouraging, although the estimation is not statistically signi…-cant at the conventional level. That said, it is clear that better empirical measures of curriculum centralization are necessary to provide more persuasive …ndings. We leave this for future work.
Discussions
Modeling Choices. Grossman and Maggi (2000) have introduced a stylized framework to analyze the e¤ects of talent distribution on trade pattern, taking the underlying talent distribution as given. In particular, the framework emphasizes the coexistence of a supermodular sector (say, auto) and a submodular sector (say, software) with the production technology of both sectors consisting of two tasks and exhibiting constant returns to talent used in the two tasks. The supermodular (submodular) production technology is characterized by input complementarity (substitutability) and thus encourages self-matching (cross-matching) in the abilities of workers constituting a production team. With constant returns to overall talent, the supermodular (submodular) production technology also implies a decreasing (increasing) return to individual talent in a production team.
It may be useful to explain why we are not adopting their exact production technology speci…cations, and to what extent our alternative speci…cations have preserved or deviated from the With an endogenous education policy as introduced above, an increase in does not alter the mean ability and the maximum output of the supermodular good, but decreases the talent diversity and the maximum output of the submodular good. Thus there would be no trade-o¤ in setting , and a lower strictly dominates a higher one, defeating any purpose to rationalize different choices of across countries. Thus, we preserve the supermodularity but impose decreasing returns to overall talent in the auto sector, so that an increase in increases the maximum output of the supermodular good. We generalize the original 2-task framework of Grossman and Maggi (2000) to n-tasks for the supermodular sector, which is a straightforward generalization and agrees with the image of a long production chain typical of such production processes.
Second, given the modi…cations to the supermodular sector, the e¤ects of goods price change on the wage structure of the software worker and hence the talent allocation across the two sectors cannot be signed, which hinders attempts of comparative statics analysis. Thus, we simplify the submodular production technology in the software sector to consist of only a single task instead of two; actually, with a submodular production technology, it increases the aggregate output to break up a production team of any size and conduct the work individually, which was also pointed out by Grossman and Maggi (2000) . The increasing return to individual talent in a submodular production process is preserved by assuming an increasing return to the talent used in the single task. Given the alternative technology speci…cations, the convexity of the software industry's wage structure is preserved, while the auto industry's wage structure becomes concave instead of being linear, re ‡ecting the decreasing returns to overall talent. Instead of two cuto¤s in the talent allocation re ‡ecting cross-matching of the lowest and the highest abilities of workers in the software industry in Grossman and Maggi (2000) , there is only one cuto¤ in the talent allocation in our framework: the less-talented workers self-match to toil in the auto sector and only the more-talented workers choose to work alone in the software sector. Thus, our framework does not imply a necessarily higher talent (wage) dispersion in the submodular sector as would arise in the framework of Grossman and Maggi (2000) .
The main results of this paper on the pattern of endogenous education systems following trade are however robust to many variations to the current technology speci…cations. In fact, any such speci…cations that lead to the comparative static results (
in Lemma 2 will su¢ ce. In other words, as long as the output of one industry increases in the homogeneity of abilities while that of the other industry decreases in it, our main results will go through. More generally, our analytical framework and results can be applied to other dimensions of education systems as long as they a¤ect di¤erent industries in distinct ways.
In the model, we have taken country sizes to be the same across countries (with a unit measure of population). As the production technologies in both sectors exhibit constant returns to scale (the measure of population, say, L) and the preferences are identical and homothetic in the two countries, the country sizes can di¤er without a¤ecting the comparative advantage and trade pattern. It is also straightforward to verify that introduction of di¤erent country sizes (L J , L U ) will not a¤ect the qualitative results regarding the endogenous choice of education systems either.
The linear disutility function for individuals going through the education system is used to simplify the exposition; a more general functional form may be adopted without changing our substantial results. For example, the alternative disutility functional form could be K( ; k), where the disutility increases with the level of discipline and a parameter k, with @K( ;k) @ @k > 0 such that the marginal disutility with respect to is higher when k is larger.
Education and Skills. The education system in the model is characterized by a single parameter that measures the level of discipline imposed on students to conform to some standardized tests or a common set of skills, where a high-pressure education system decreases the skill gaps among students but by its very nature also reduces the diversity in talent. Available evidence suggests that this captures the crucial di¤erence between the Japanese and the US education systems. The US students, for example, exhibit larger diversity in international test scores in math and science than the Japanese students, and the more so among the secondary-school students than the elementary-school students (Hanushek and Kimko 2000, Hanushek 2002 ). Some scholars argue that initiative, creativity, and entrepreneurship are emphasized more in the US education, which are di¢ cult to measure by standardized tests (Mayer, Tajika, and Stanley 1991 , Bracey 2002 , Ramirez et al. 2006 ). While we acknowledge that it is possible to increase the basic skill level in some dimensions (e.g., reading, math and science) for all students without reducing the desirable diversity in other dimensions, our key insight on the fundamental trade-o¤ among di¤erent sets of skills remains valid, since resources that can be devoted to all these dimensions of skills cannot be unlimited and thus some tough allocation decisions have to be made. Hence, it is almost inevitable that when countries vary in their emphasis on di¤erent combinations of skills, this will have a bearing on their comparative advantages in trade.
The education parameter in our model can be interpreted in alternative ways to represent di¤erent features of an education system. For example, the degree of curriculum centralization is used as a measure of in the above empirical analysis. It is also possible to interpret as the degree of ability pooling in school, the prevalence of public schools and the degree of income equality.
The links between these three factors and skill diversity in a closed economy have been studied extensively in the literature of economics of education. 21 These factors are not explicitly modeled in our paper, except for the part captured by , given our main focus on the dynamics between two sectors and two trading countries. 22 By focusing on the homogenizing/standardizing pressure, our paper also highlights a distinct aspect of the education system that has not received much attention in the literature but may exert fundamental e¤ects on a country's work force composition, sectorial specialization, and comparative advantage in trade. That said, it would be interesting in future research to consider a richer model that takes into account multiple features of an education system and to work out their interactions in shaping the talent distribution.
Stable Di¤erence in Education Systems. Our model shows that the contrasting styles of education systems in the US and Japan could be a long-term equilibrium outcome that is compatible with and reinforced by their trade pattern. Their initial di¤erence, which was possibly due to distinct historical and cultural contexts, could be quite small but then gets reinforced over time and becomes di¢ cult to reverse (short of dramatic shocks to the trade pattern).
A large degree of decentralization has long been a distinguishing feature of the US education system, and the evolution of this organization structure, dating back to the colonial era, has been "at least partially serendipitous" (Black and Sokolo¤ 2006) . The decentralized structure in …nancing and administering schools by local or state authorities, through enhanced experimentation and ‡exibility and focused attention to local environments, has served the US quite well. Though in 2 1 For example, see Bénabou (1996) , Epple and Romano (1998), Fernández and Rogerson (1998) , and Takii and Tanaka (2009) among others.
2 2 Allowing unequal educational resources to exert extra in ‡uence on skill diversity is not likely to change our main results. For example, starting from the same inequality in educational resources in both Japan and US, a higher in Japan leads to a more homogenous skill pool, which will then lead to a lower income inequality that in turn contributes to even more homogenous skills in future generations in comparison to the US. Thus, the e¤ect of on skill diversity is enlarged by allowing unequal resources.
recent decades there are certain concerns about the relatively low performance of the US students in international tests compared with other developed countries, and some policies are adopted to address the under-performing poor school districts (Dillon 2007 (Dillon , 2009 ), it does not appear that the distinctive features of the US education system, such as its decentralized manner, relatively low pressure on students, and emphasis on individual initiative and creativity, will change at all.
As a latecomer in modern education, Japan in the Meiji era experimented with local funding and operation of education "only to discover that the people would not pay, so after only a few years of this experiment, the Meiji state took over the full burden of …nancing the public school system. ...
The reliance on state support was associated with a uniform curriculum, a central system for exams and textbook production, and other centralizing tendencies"that deliver more homogeneous student outcomes than the decentralized US education system (Cummings 1999) . Similar experiences were repeated during the American occupation of Japan after the World War II; the decentralization e¤ort initiated by the American was reversed years later to …t traditional Japanese models more closely (Beauchamp 1987) . In recent years, in an e¤ort to prevent "cram education" and boost individual potentials and ability to think, Japan has experimented with various teaching methods under the so-called Yutori (Relaxed) Education. However, the new education guidelines have again met with strong resistance from education experts and parents. 23 These experiences illustrate the di¢ culty to reverse the initial pattern of a country's education style.
Concluding Remarks
Recognizing the increasingly important role of education in enhancing a country's international competitiveness in the world economy, many countries have made serious e¤orts to adjust their education systems. These e¤orts, however, are not always successful partly because many crucial issues are not well understood. For example, what are the inherent links, if any, between a country's education system and its comparative advantage in trade? In an attempt to understand this issue, this paper provides a theory on the simultaneous determination of a country's education system and its comparative advantage in trade.
The results of this paper show that, compared with the autarky situation, the initial di¤erence in education systems tends to be enlarged when two countries are open to trade, since the free trade price falls in between the autarky prices and hence strengthens the incentives by countries to specialize more through further di¤erentiated education systems. Such di¤erentiation, however, may still fall short of the world optimal level if the education policies are chosen in each country to maximize its own social welfare, taking into consideration the terms-of-trade e¤ects of its education policy but ignoring the e¤ects on the welfare of other countries. An implication is that the observed 2 3 See, for example, http://www.mext.go.jp/english/org/struct/014.htm, and Takayama (2007) .
divergence in the styles of education systems across countries is an endogenous equilibrium outcome compatible with and reinforced by the observed trade pattern. Some empirical evidence consistent with our theoretical characterizations/predictions are provided.
The current paper focuses on how the trade pattern between two advanced industrial economies and their education systems interact, where persistent di¤erences in education systems across countries arise in the equilibrium. A fruitful topic in future research may be to study how the education system of a country, competing and trading in the world economy, evolves dynamically over time as it advances across development stages. For instance, as a country moves from a low value-added exporter to a high value-added one, its education system may need to adapt itself accordingly, shifting its main focus from equipping the majority of workforce with some basic skills to promoting knowledge-intensive skills with creativity at the core. It seems plausible that, while retaining their distinctive styles in some dimensions, the education systems across countries may become similar in other aspects once they reach the same development stage. , and f ( ) and g( ) are the probability density functions corresponding to F ( ) and G( ), respectively. We have where the …rst inequality follows because a 1 (a m a) > a 1 m (a m a) holds for any a and any < 1: it holds for a < a m , as in this case, a m a > 0 and a 1 > a 1 m , and for a > a m , as in this case, a m a < 0 and a 1 < a 1 m . The second inequality follows since The above negative sign holds because the second term is weakly negative again for the same reason that a m e a for the given price range p p m , and because the …rst term is negative for Z a h e a a 1 (a m a)f (a)da < Z a h e a a 1 m (a m a)f (a)da < 0:
The …rst inequality follows because a 1 (a m a) < a 1 m (a m a) holds for any a and any > 1, and the last inequality follows because R a h e a a f (a)
1 F (e a) da > a m .
Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. De…ne a R e a a l a f (a)
F (e a) da and a R a h e a a f (a)
1 F (e a) da, and note that a < a m < a. Further note that F (a m ) = G(a m ) 1 2 by condition (A1). By (11), we have the following condition on the equilibrium price, omitting the decoration to simplify presentations: 
where the …rst inequality follows by the concavity (convexity) of the auto (software) production, the second inequality by the fact that a < a m < a, and the last weak inequality by the condition that 1 2 . Suppose that e a < a m . By (7), this implies that p > p m ; on the other hand, by (24) and the condition that F (a m ) Thus, it must be the case that a m e a at the equilibrium, or equivalently, the price must be such that p p m at the equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. De…ne V (p; J ; U ) 
